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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee : Case No. 930459-CA 
v. j Priority No. 2 
SEAN MICHAEL O'BRIEN, : 
Defendant/Appellant : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions of five counts of 
burglary, third degree felonies in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-202 (1990); four counts of theft, class B misdemeanors, in 
violation of § 76-6-404 (1990) and five counts of criminal 
mischief, class C misdemeanors, in violation of § 76-6-106 
(1992) . 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the case pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1993). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
There are two issues before this Court: 
1) Did defendant properly marshal the evidence in support of 
the jury's guilty verdicts? Where defendant has failed to 
marshal the evidence in support of the jury's verdicts and then 
demonstrate that, even viewing such evidence in the light most 
favorable to the verdicts, the evidence is insufficient to 
support the verdicts, this Court may properly decline to review 
defendant's sufficiency of the evidence claim. State v. Pilling, 
875 P.2d 604, 607-8 (Utah App. 1994). See also Crookston v. Fire 
Ins. exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 799-800 (Utah 1991); Saunders v. 
Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991); State v. Chavez 840 P.2d 
846, 848 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 
1993); State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738-39 (Utah App. 1990). 
2) If defendant has met the marshaling requirement, was 
sufficient evidence introduced at the jury trial to prove 
defendant committed multiple counts of burglary, theft and 
criminal mischief? In reviewing defendant's convictions, this 
Court reviews all the evidence, and inferences from such 
evidence, in a light most favorable to the jury's verdicts. 
State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983); State v. Johnson, 
774 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah 1989); State v. Sherard, 818 P.2d 554, 
557 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992). A 
jury verdict will only be reversed if the evidence "is 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt" that 
defendant committed the crimes. Johnson, 774 P.2d at 1147; State 
v. Ireand, 773 P.2d 1375, 1379 (Utah 1989); Petree, 659 P.2d at 
444. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant state and federal constitutional provisions are 
reproduced in the Addenda. Relevant state statutes are reproduced 
in the text of the brief. State rules of appellate procedure are 
reproduced in Addendum A. 
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STATE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann, § 76-6-202 Burglary (1990). 
(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains 
unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building with intent 
to commit a felony or theft or commit an assault on any person. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 Theft (1990). 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises 
unauthorized control over the property of another with a purpose 
to deprive him thereof. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-106 Criminal Mischief (1992). 
(1) A person commits criminal mischief if: . . . 
(c) he intentionally damages, defaces, or destroys the 
property of another. . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged in February of 1993, by amended 
information, with five counts of burglary, four counts of theft 
and five counts of criminal mischief (R. 29). The charges 
stemmed from a series of crimes involving five business locations 
in Cedar City (R. 26-9). Defendant was arraigned, pled not 
guilty to the charges and a one day jury trial was held in which 
defendant was found guilty of all counts (R. 36-7 & 66-9). 
Defendant was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for zero to 
five (0-5) years, for each of the five burglary convictions, 
three of the five sentences to be served consecutively to the 
remaining two concurrent terms (R. 108-15). The trial judge 
stayed sentencing of the four theft and five criminal mischief 
convictions (R. 114-115). 
Defendant filed a notice of appeal and then a motion to 
remand the case back to the trial court for determination of a 
3 
motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence (R. 117 & 
Defendant's Motion for New Trial 1). Defendant alleged that 
State's witness, Steven A. Backus, had recanted his trial 
testimony which had implicated defendant in the burglaries (Def. 
Mt., Exhibit 1). This Court denied defendant's motion to remand 
the case to the trial court (Order, May 25, 1994), stating. 
The case now proceeds in this Court with the sole issue for 
determination being a challenge to the jury verdict on the basis 
of sufficiency of the evidence (Appl. Br. 1). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
During the nighttime hours on the weekend of January 30, 
1993, five businesses in Cedar City, Utah were burglarized with 
four of the five businesses having money and/or property stolen 
(R. 262-4). 
The burglars entered the Fun and Games video arcade through 
the bathroom window by breaking the window open with large rocks 
and then stole the money in the cash register (R. 280-1). Zion 
Sun Floral was entered through a broken window, an unlocked 
filing cabinet had been pried open with hammers and money was 
stolen along with silk roses, of a type not known to be sold 
elsewhere in the town (R. 286-7 & 387-9). 
Steve's Texaco was burglarized with entry gained through 
broken windows, an unlocked filing cabinet was pried open with a 
hammer, and cigarettes and money were stolen (R. 289-92) . 
Harding Glass shop was burglarized with entry gained through 
a broken window. No money was kept in the store and therefore, 
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none was stolen (R. 294-6) . A freshly painted floor in the shop 
contained foot prints of the burglars (R. 294). 
Tyner's Pet store was burglarized with entry gained through 
a window which was forced open, the cash register had been broken 
open and loose change was missing (no cash or checks were in the 
store at the time of the burglary) from the register (R. 299-
303) . 
All five of the businesses were in close proximity of the 
Econo Lodge Motel, known as the Economy Apartments (R. 275-6). 
Police officers investigating the burglaries contacted two 
juveniles, Brian Tsosie and Todd Davenport, who confessed to the 
crimes (R. 261-273). Tsosie and Davenport implicated adults 
involved in the burglaries (R. 310-324 & 357-70). One of the 
adults implicated was defendant, Sean O'Brien (id.). 
Four of the five stores were entered in a similar manner; 
however all of the businesses suffered property damage at the 
point of entry or break-in (R. 280-302). Steve's Texaco, Zion Sun 
Floral, Fun and Games videQ arcade and Harding Glass all had a 
window broken by rocks in order to gain entry (R. 264). Tyner's 
Pet Store had a small window forced open at the point of entry 
(R. 264) . All of the stores, except one, had money stolen (R. 
279-305) . 
Defendant denied participating in the burglaries and 
testified that he was asleep on Friday night and home alone on 
Saturday night and therefore, did not burglarize the stores (R. 
397-410). However, in searching the apartment that defendant and 
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the other burglars lived in, the police found a dog chain taken 
from Tyner's Pet store the night of the burglary and a rose and 
figurines from Zion Sun Floral, also taken the night of the 
burglary (R. 316, 321, 361, 362, 364). 
A jury found defendant guilty of five counts of burglary, 
five counts of criminal mischief and four counts of theft (R.435-
40) . 
Specific facts elicited during direct and cross-examination 
of the State's witnesses will be discussed in detail, as they 
relate to the State's argument, in the body of this brief. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant has failed to marshal the evidence that supports 
the jury's guilty verdicts. Instead, defendant merely reiterates 
the argument he made at trial, the very argument which the jury 
rejected. Therefore, this Court should refuse to review 
defendant's sufficiency of the evidence claim. Even if defendant 
had marshaled the evidence, the jury's verdicts render 
defendant's claim meritless as the guilty verdicts are supported 
by ample evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE 
EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF HIS CLAIM THAT THE 
STATE HAS FAILED TO PROVE BY SUFFICIENT 
EVIDENCE DEFENDANT COMMITTED BURGLARY, THEFT 
AND CRIMINAL MISCHIEF, THIS COURT SHOULD 
REFUSE TO CONSIDER HIS CLAIM. 
Defendant's failure to comply with the marshaling 
requirement prevents further review of defendant's sufficiency of 
6 
Lhv e v i d e n c e rJa.im< S t a l e i . I i l l i n g , fl7r. F\ 1~M Gf'4, 607-8 (Utah 
App. 1994) {"In chal lenging the sufficiency ot the evidence, 
defendant carries a heavy burden, Defendant must 'marshal all 
t h e ev i cie n c" fj s u ppoi t i ng 11 le < e rd :i c t ai id show how1 t h i s 
marshaled evidence is insufficient to support the verdict even 
when viewed in the ] ight most favorable to the :' 
) (c:i tati :: TIs om:i 11eci) 11 : , West V alley City v Majestic 
Inv. Co., 818 E 2d 1311, 3 31 5 (Utah App 3 9:93 ) t .he marshaling" 
requirement was explained in detail: 
[T]he marshaling concept does not reflect a desire to 
merely have pertinent excerpts from the record readily 
available to a reviewing court. The marshaling process 
is not unlike becoming the devil's advocate. Counsel 
must extricate himself or herself from the client's 
shoes and fully assume the adversary's position. In 
order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the 
evidence, the challenger must present, in comprehensive 
and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence 
introduced at trial which supports the very findings 
the appellant resists. After constructing this 
magnificent array of supporting evidence, the 
challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the 
evidence. The gravity of this flaw must be sufficient 
to convince the appellate court that the court's 
finding resting upon the evidence is clearly erroneous., 
Defendant al ] eges the State did not prove the elements of 
the burglaries H Dwever, the two main witnesses for the State, 
Tsosie ai i :i Da >./ ei ipo: : t, testi fi ed that defendant, pai ticipated :i i I 
al 3 five of the burglaries, that entry was gained into four of 
the r--finesses breaking the windows wi th rocks and boosting 
i .., . ' hoi es tl lat the f :i f th I »us i mess was 
entered by picking on the back window, that a unique 
flower was taken A - * • . *] or al shop a d ::>g chad i i was taken from 
the pet shop and - . - - nce was 3 atei: f DI irici b> pc 13 ce 3 i I 11 le 
7 
defendant's apartment (R. 308-339 & 355-81). Although no finger 
prints were found, the State did try to match foot prints found 
in the glass shop with shoes of the defendant. However, 
Davenport testified that his mother, one of the burglars, 
insisted they throw away their shoes and buy new ones after the 
burglaries (R. 319). Although defendant and his mother threw 
their shoes away, defendant was unsure if anyone else did (R. 
319) . 
Defendant's testimony was that he was asleep and home alone 
the nights in question and did not participate in the crimes (R. 
400). On appeal defendant provides no justification for his 
allegations of insufficient evidence other than 1) the lack of 
finger prints or shoe print matches; 2) inconsistencies in the 
dates of the burglaries as testified to by Tsosie and Davenport 
and 3) the changed testimony of another witness, Steven Backus. 
Although defendant alleges Davenport admitted to lying, defendant 
fails to cite to the record in support of such an allegation 
(Appl. Br. 5). In fact, counsel refers to Davenport's answer 
which consisted of, "Yes. Not sure. Probably." When cross-
examined at trial as to what was the correct answer, Davenport 
answered in the affirmative. Defense counsel stated, "So you 
were lying when--back at the preliminary hearing?" and Davenport 
answered, "I think I was," (R. 337). As Davenport did not 
previously answer "no," at the preliminary hearing, his 
affirmative answer in trial was not inconsistent with his earlier 
testimony. 
8 
Defendant ban ~~t shown how any : - :„h^ fest imonj piuvided 
abovt- **• : -=?L:f f : cient * :• ;ppc: : the r-;J. :-, r- merely states 
tha nesses' testimony and it 
is therefore * . i ...-.icr/. ,• nprobab.e that a reasonable 
person must have reasonably doubted," (App .', . Tsosie and 
h a v ^ n p o i 1 , a I Idiouql i < 'mif u s e d , " ' "i A±±S U I t h e c r i m e s , 
were not confused as to defendant .=- . .. , ivement i n the cr:i mes and 
stated so in the • (R 33.9 & 380 II ) . 
"Where there is any evidence, includd i ig i: easonable 
inferences that can be drawn from it, from which 
findings of all the elements of the crime can be made 
beyond a reasonable doubt, our inquiry is complete and 
we will sustain the verdict"...Reversal is warranted 
only when the evidence is so inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the 
crime. 
State v. Jiron, No. 93 064 0-CA, slip op. at 7 (Utah App. 
Sept 
Having failed : . piope::i> marsha*1 ^u^ evidence supporting 
the tr:a -o-^ • ' - - c—- defendant has . >t arid cannot make the 
require :i questd on, ^ i :l ewed :i i I the 
l i g h t :i ^ t fc:v - l a r . e ; • t »: v.-- .;..-: -, i s against the clear weight 
of the evidence or that a mistake has been made, Id. See also 
State v . Pelton, BO I l~" »hi I H4 I HS (lit a,h t \pp 1 '''V-iO) Defendant 
does not show how the evidence supporting the conviction is so 
flawed as Lo warrant reversal Heie lecitation r the facts 
W h i c h S u p p o r t . I l i a I l i t - O l ,' <i | t i n - M - ' i m i l i I 
effort to muster the evidence favorable to the verdict and 
demonstrate its insufficiency State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 470, 
472 (Utah App. 1991) (defendant must marshal the evidence, it is 
not the curt's duty to sort through all of the evidence and 
decide what supports the conviction). Because defendant failed to 
marshal the evidence supporting the jury's verdict, this Court 
should refuse to address his claim of insufficiency of the 
evidence. 
POINT II 
EVEN IF THIS COURT REACHES THE MERITS OF THE 
SUFFICIENCY CLAIM, DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION 
SHOULD BE AFFIRMED AS THE JURY'S VERDICTS ARE 
SUPPORTED BY ABUNDANT EVIDENCE. 
Defendant's convictions are amply supported by the evidence 
introduced at trial. The fact that the jury disbelieved 
defendant's version of his whereabouts on the nights in question 
does not constitute grounds for reversal of his conviction. The 
standard for a sufficiency of the evidence claim requires this 
Court to 
review the evidence an all inferences which may 
reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable 
to the verdict of the jury. We reverse a jury 
conviction for insufficient evidence only when the 
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime of which he was 
convicted. 
State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983); See also. State 
v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 332 (Utah 1991). Defendant asserts that 
the jury erred by not accepting his testimony as more reliable 
than Tsosie or Davenport, the two juvenile defendants who 
implicated defendant. Such a claim is ignores both the 
applicable jury instructions and law which address the issue. 
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In this case as i n State v. Valdez, 748 P.2d 1050 (Utah 1987), 
11 i e c o u i t: s t a t e d t h a t 11: I • B S t a t e' s e \ :i d e n c e "  v* - - - : -. / 
controverted by the defense, whi cl i offered contradictory 
testimony... The mere existence of the contrary evil dence does not 
war i: ant di stui: b:i i lg 1:1: le jui } ' s < e:i tl i€ ji :i:i : ;r ' s 
function 'to weigh the conflicting evidence presented and draw 
j.Uo "fusions . i 4 - • *-*:-. a~ ~ : - omitted) . 
; a ties that 
defendant committed :.-. o n m e s charged: 
Todd Davenpcr • -mrteen ye.-.v « . o *• .:- adjudicated •. * 
that while . :- . \- ;.; / *; « .: Economy Apartments 
w^ r-* : - • defendant *--:-•: ar.r:' - * r- : -e F:~-^-> • 
identified as Wa„t : Scr. ^ :. * ^ . . a-:.tified as Bertc and 
Beiiu & wxic ucn - defendant - - * * * apartment which was 
i n close proxi mi ty tc the cr inie scenes (R 3 0 7 .3 3 ) Da i » enport 
testified t:ia* •. w* . - , » • :
 # "Walter, Tsosie and 
defendant brokr — • - Steve ' - ?-v-- breaki^-* * - window with a 
•rork ar , . . . ;he wii idow 
because ; - - *-• smallest * \* ;: . * - vent to a door 
and - - - • - , . . . » . ^ Davenport 
test. . - . . . lexaco and that he 
was given - i mother f ^  i _ *~Lioiion in the 
)avenport testified that d b i n m a r method was 
used . . . ^ al where money was stolen (R 
.,. 11 
314). Davenport received a dollar from his mother after the 
burglary (R. 315). Davenport also testified that the silk rose 
introduced at trial was the one he saw his mother take from the 
store and put inside her purse along with two small figurines of 
animals (R. 316). Davenport testified that he was confused abut 
how many stores they broke into in one night but stated that he 
thought that they robbed the Texaco and the floral shop one night 
and the glass shop, pet shop and arcade the next night (R. 317-
19). Davenport testified that the group entered Harding Glass by 
breaking a window and the others boosting him through the hole 
but he did not believe anything was taken from the shop (R. 319-
20). The group then broke into the pet shop by picking the lock 
on the back window and boosting Davenport through the window (R. 
320). Davenport's mother took a dog chain which she later put on 
Davenport's dog (R. 321). Davenport did not remember if any 
money was taken from the pet shop (R. 320). The group then went 
to the arcade named Fun and Games where they broke a window and 
boosted Davenport through the hole (R. 323) . Davenport could not 
remember if any money was stolen but his mother later gave him 
two dollars in quarters for his participation (R. 324). Davenport 
testified that his mother bought him new shoes and that he and 
his mother threw away their old shoes (R. 319). Davenport 
testified that his mother had threatened to beat him up if he 
testified regarding the burglaries (R. 317). 
Defense counsel thoroughly cross-examined Davenport and 
Tsosie regarding inconsistencies in their testimony. Davenport 
12 
was confronted wi tl i h Is tes t imony from, the pre.1 imi nary hearing 
and admitted that I: le was coi if u sed about wl li cl: i » < M ^ iiPini es occur re il 
on which night (R 328-40), Davenport testifiec. ^owever, that 
while he was confused about some details as It had happened a 
l ong t ime : . • . : . . - . - : nui i ei'iieniljt-1 i. iiai, niuuli-•• good, " (R. 
331) , he *:- :.- doubt that defendant was at every burglary and 
partirir:"'--"i :: une cxiuies (R. 328-40) . 
B r I an T s o s :i e,, a sevent een ye ar - o 1 d, a < I j ud :i c a t e d :i i i j i „ \ ei i :i 1 e 
court for : .- r *: t -pai "t, ': '> 'rimes, testified to details 
WJ1^CJ:I
 coir0jj0iated Davenr *ui & ucbi Isosie estified that 
while liv-ina wiM avenports. defendant and >ers :i i I the 
apartment :• . -,-:iomy motel participate-" "- '•• : . vi-
• - *' . un hiuc -,: ": ' T?cs*.:-
defendant, the Davenport? and ar ....-.-. ;. named Bobby .-/.-. :.r 
broke :;-• * h-- 'i'ex.; :•; ar: : floral shop ry breaking r>r w.naows and 
r - . ..v , .: _ . .->,-.,. „ . .: -:-•. ort 
unlocked ; '.-• ac.j:d a;-.:! -c: • . ::. .-• inside .s:sie 
testified that although L~ .;.a ;,..•'. ;:emembe: it n:c:.ey wai- stolen 
fi om the Texacc : pc p • arid c:i gar ettes wei e stc: ] en OR 359) At tl le 
f1ora1 shop, figuri nes and f1owers wer e t a ken (R, 360 -3) . The 
next night Tsosie, Todd Davenport, defendant, Bobby Taylor and 
,„ b m k e into I IK-1 arcade t"ak,ii"iq coiiri c books IK" '-u.4-
Tsosie dicJ not remember any money being taken .^° 
grou: •- . led by Davenport's mother, Elizabeth, broke into 
id some 
1
 -- , : t : : ' ial: :::>.•. g r o u p , m i n u s E l i z a b e t h 
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Davenport, went to the glass shop and broke in (R. 369). It was 
about 2:00 a.m. and Tsosie testified that Todd Davenport was very 
tired (R. 369). No money was taken from the store but a piece of 
plexi-glass was taken by Walter (R. 370-2). Defense counsel 
brought out on cross-examination inconsistencies of Tsosie's 
preliminary hearing testimony. Tsosie had conflicting statements 
regarding whether or not Walter participated in all the crimes 
and whether all the burglaries took place on one night or over 
the period of two nights (R. 375-78). Tsosie was clear, however, 
that defendant participated in all the crimes (R. 379-81) . 
Stephen Backus, did not participate in the crimes but 
testified that on a New Year's Eve party on January 1, 1993, 
defendant discussed the plans to burglarize the stores and asked 
Backus if he wanted to participate (R. 340-44). On the weekend 
of the burglaries, Backus was using a pay phone at approximately 
2:30 a.m. when he noticed a group of people at the Harding Glass 
shop, one which he could identify as the defendant due to 
defendant's red hair (R. 345-6). Towards the end of January 
defendant approached Backus and stated he had committed the 
burglaries (R. 347). Defense counsel cross-examined Backus 
regarding his possible motives for false testimony against 
defendant (R. 349-352) and the low probability that Backus could 
recognize defendant in the dark from a distance (R. 351-2) . 
Defense counsel, in his motion to dismiss, articulated the 
deficiencies of Backus' testimony (R. 382-3) . Defense counsel, 
in closing argument, addressed the inconsistencies in Tsosie and 
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Davenport's testimony as well as the deficiencies of Backus' 
testimony (R. 422-5) . 
Additionally, the jurors were given instructions on 
conflicting witness testimony providing: 
[I]t is your duty... to determine which version of the 
evidence you will believe or not believe, based on the 
believability of the witness..other evidence in the 
case, and good reason...you should consider..bias or 
interest in the matter...motive...appearance and 
demeanor...reasonableness...truthfulness...capacity to 
remember... and determine the weight and 
credibility..to give to the testimony of the witness. 
(R. 97-95). 
Importantly, all witnesses were excluded from the courtroom 
before trial and were, therefore, unable to adapt their testimony 
to fit other testimony given at trial (R. 253). Davenport and 
Tsosies' testimony included all five burglaries, how entry was 
made, who participated, what was stolen. Backus testified 
primarily to the Harding Glass burglary, not witnessing the 
crime, but merely placing defendant in the area at the time of 
the burglary. Backus' testimony was not a vital piece of 
evidence but merely corroborative of the two accomplice's 
testimony. 
In further support of the sufficiency of the evidence 
claim, defendant alleges that a State witness, Steven Backus, has 
recanted his trial testimony. In December 1993, nearly one year 
after the burglaries occurred, Backus filed an affidavit with 
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defense counsel recanting his trial statements.1 Defendant 
attaches this affidavit in his addenda. However, defendant 
cannot make allegations in his brief supported by an affidavit 
which was not a part of the record below. State v Montes, 804 
P.2d 543, 546 (Utah App. 1991) (affidavits which are not a part 
of the record below will not be considered on appeal). Nor, can 
defendant attempt to provide a factual basis for his sufficiency 
of the evidence claim by attaching a witness affidavit to his 
brief. State v. Aase, 762 P.2d 1113, 1117 (Utah App. 1988) 
("affidavits which are not a part of the record below will not be 
considered unless they are juror affidavits and fall within well-
delineated exceptions to the rule"). Therefore, in accordance 
with the State's Motion to Strike, filed separately with the 
Court, this Court should strike the affidavit from the 
defendant's addenda and strike portions of the defendant's brief 
xBackus now claims that defendant did not tell him about the 
burglaries nor did Backus see defendant in the vicinity of the 
glass shop (Affidavit of Stephen Backus, page 2) . However, Backus' 
"new" testimony, provided in his affidavit which recants his trial 
testimony does nothing more^than corroborate defendant's testimony 
that he was not involved in the crimes. As stated in the State's 
reply to defendant's Motion to Remand, such testimony is 
insufficient for a motion for new trial and the State asserts that 
it is insufficient to warrant reversal on appeal. 
Although this Court has not addressed the issue of recanted 
witness testimony on appeal, in State v. Kinder, 381 P.2d 82, 84 
(Utah 1963) , the Utah Supreme Court held that recanted alibi 
testimony given in a robbery trial should only be addressed by way 
of a motion for new trial to the trial court, not on appeal. See 
Brown v. State, 816 P.2d 818 (Wyo. 1991) (test for reversal of 
recanted testimony provides that new testimony is so material it 
would probably produce a different jury verdict if a new trial were 
granted and it is not cumulative of other evidence produced at 
trial). Here, Backus' testimony, merely being corroborative of the 
two main state's witnesses, would not affect a different result if 
recanted. 
16 
which rely on the improperly filed affidavit. 
As for the properly raised sufficiency of the evidence 
claims, the jury apparently believed the evidence presented by 
the State's witnesses to be credible and chose not to accept 
defendant's version of the facts. See Valdez, 748 P.2d at 1053. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant, by failing to marshal the evidence in support of 
his sufficiency of the evidence claim, deprives this Court of the 
opportunity to review the merits of that allegation. 
Even if defendant had marshaled the evidence, he has failed 
to show that the evidence supporting his conviction is so 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt that defendant committed 
burglary, theft or criminal mischief. 
For these reasons the State respectfully requests that this 
Court affirm defendant's convictions. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J/_ of October, 1994. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
JULIE GEO^G^ " ' 
Assistant Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing motion was mailed, First-Class postage prepaid, to 
Floyd W. Holm, Attorney for Defendant, 965 South Main, Suite 3, 






RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
Utah R. App. P. 24 (1994 AS AMENDED). Briefs. 
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the 
appellant shall contain under appropriate headings and 
in the order indicated: 
... 
(2) A table of contents, including the 
contents of the addendum, with page 
references. 
... 
(5) A statement of the issues presented for 
review, including for each issue: the 
standard of appellate review with supporting 
authority, and 
(A) citation to the record showing 
that the issue was preserved in the 
trial court; or 
(B) a statement of grounds for 
seeking review of an issue not 
preserved in the trial court. 
(7) A statement of the case. The statement 
shall first indicate briefly the nature of 
the case, the course of proceedings, and its 
disposition in the court below. A statement 
of the facts relevant to the issues presented 
for review shall follow. All statements of 
fact and references to the proceedings below 
shall be supported by citations to the record 
in accordance with paragraph (e) of this 
rule. 
(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the 
contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect 
to the issues presented, including the grounds for 
reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, 
with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts 
of the record relied on. 
(e) References in briefs to the record. 
References shall be made to the pages of the original 
record as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b) or to pages 
of any statement of the evidence or proceedings or 
agreed .catement prepared pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 
11(g). References to exhibits shall be made to the 
exhibit numbers. If reference is made to evidence the 
admissibility of which is in controversy, reference 
shall be made to the pages of the record at which the 




INSTRUCTION NO. 3 
Part of the Court's duty is to decide on the 
admissibility of evidence in this trial. These decisions are 
made purely on the basis of law. You are not to be concerned 
with the reasons for the Court's rulings, either admitting or 
excluding evidence, and you should draw no inferences from those 
rulings. 
In admitting evidence, the Court does not rule on the 
weight or convincing force of the evidence, nor does it pass on 
the credibility of the witness or party offering the evidence. 
These are matters for you to decide. 
If any objection to a question is sustained by the 
Court, you should disregard the question and not speculate or 
guess as to what the answer might have been or the reason for the 
objection. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 4 
It often occurs in trials that there is a conflict in 
the testimony or evidence presented by the parties. When such 
conflicts arise, it is your duty, of possible, to reconcile those 
conflicts by the use of logic and reason. However, if you cannot 
reasonably reconcile the conflicts, then it is your duty, if 
possible, to determine which version of the evidence you will 
believe or not believe, based on the believability of the 
witness, the other evidence in the case, and good reason. There 
are no definite rules on deciding what evidence you believe or do 
not believe or how much weight you will give to any evidence, but 
you should make that decision carefully and conscientiously. You 
are not bound to believe all that the witnesses have said or any 
witness or class of witnesses unless the testimony is reasonable 
and convincing in view of all the facts and circumstances in the 
case. You may believe one witness against many or many as 
against a few, in accordance with your honest convictions. 
If you believe a witness has willfully testified 
falsely as to any material fact, you may disregard his entire 
testimony or any part of it, or give it that reduced weight to 
which you feel it is entitled. 
You are further instructed that in deciding the weight 
and believability of the testimony of any witness, you should 
consider his bias or interest in the matter, and any motive 
shown, or lack thereof, to testify in a particular way. You may 
also consider the appearance and demeanor of the witness, the 
reasonableness of his statements, his truthfulness, his 
opportunity to know, his ability to understand and communicate, 
his capacity to remember, and any other facts relevant to his 
desire or ability to present accurate testimony. 
You may also consider whether the witness was 
contradicted by other evidence or whether he contradicted 
himself. From all these factors, you should determine the weight 
and credibility you will give to the testimony of the witness. 
